The paper is concerned with the Lighthill-Whitham model of traffic flow, where the density of cars is described by a scalar conservation law. A cost functional is introduced, depending on the departure time and on the arrival time of each driver. Under natural assumptions, we prove the existence of a unique globally optimal solution, minimizing the total cost to all drivers. This solution contains no shocks and can be explicitly described. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution, where no driver can lower his individual cost by changing his own departure time. A characterization of the Nash solution is provided, establishing its uniqueness. Some explicit examples are worked out, comparing the costs of the optimal and the equilibrium solution. The analysis also yields a strategy for optimal toll pricing.
Introduction
Aim of this paper is to analyze globally optimal solutions and Nash equilibrium solutions for a specific problem of traffic flow. Car drivers starting from a location A (a residential neighborhood) need to reach a destination B (a working place) all at a given time T . There is a cost for starting early and a cost for arriving late. Clearly, these costs can also account for the total time spent in the car. Denoting by τ d and τ a respectively the departure and the arrival time, the total cost to an individual driver is 
(1.2) psidef
If L is the length of the highway connecting A with B, and v is the speed of cars, then
It is now easy to compute the optimal departure time for each driver:
The problem is that, if everyone adopts the same optimal strategy and departs exactly at the same time, a huge traffic jam is created and this strategy is not optimal anymore. To resolve this issue, one needs to look at a better model, taking into account the fact that the speed of cars depends on the traffic density.
Call ρ = ρ(t, x) the density of cars at time t at the point x along the highway. The LighthillWitham-Richards model LW, Richards [15, 16] describes the evolution of ρ in terms of the conservation law
Here the decreasing function v = v(ρ) describes the velocity of cars depending on the density. A common choice is v(ρ) = a 1 ln
The choice
is also meaningful. It yields the same qualitative properties and explicit solution formulas.
An optimization problem can now be formulated as follows. A planner needs to schedule departures, in such a way that the combined total cost is as small as possible. Let ρ(t, A) v(ρ(t, A)) =ū(t) (1.6) dep be the departure rate from A, i.e., how many drivers enter the highway per unit time. Notice that the boundary condition ( dep 1.6) at x = A is meaningful provided that the characteristic speed ∂ ρ (ρv(ρ)) is positive. As in the examples ( vd1 1.4)-( vd2 1.5), we shall assume that the map ρ → ρ v(ρ) is concave down, attaining a positive maximum at a point ρ * > 0. We regard t →ū(t) as a control function. In other words,ū(·) is a measurable function that can be assigned at will, subject only to the constraint
Clearly, the incoming flux cannot be larger than the maximum flux allowed by the conservation law ( where κ is the total number of drivers.
Let ρ = ρ(t, x) be the solution of conservation law ( be the corresponding flux. The total cost is then measured by J(u) = ϕ(t) u(t, A) dt + ψ(t − T ) u(t, B) dt .
(
1.9) tcost
It is convenient to switch the roles of the variables t, x, replacing the boundary value problem ( Remark 1. We are here making an important modeling assumption. Namely, the car density never exceeds ρ * , hence the characteristic speed is positive:
∂ ∂ρ (ρ v(ρ)) ≥ 0. As time increases, this means that characteristics move from the boundary (where x = A) toward the interior of the domain. Notice that this assumption is consistent with a causality principle (fig.
f:t73
2). By assigning the values of the incoming flux of cars at time τ , if ρ < ρ * we influence the values of the solution at future times t > τ . However, if ρ > ρ * , this boundary data would influence the values of the solution in the past, at times t < τ .
A solution to ( CP 1.10)-( inc 1.11) can be explicitly determined using the Lax formula Lax [13] . Adjusting the variables so that T = 0 and [A, B] = [0, L], the optimization problem can be written as minimize: J(u) = ϕ(t) u(t, 0) dt + ψ(t) u(t, L) dt (1.12) tco over all solutions whose initial dataū satisfy the constraints ( Under natural assumptions on the cost functions ϕ, ψ, we will show that, for every given κ > 0, this optimization problem has a unique solution. The corresponding density ρ = ρ(t, In absence of a higher authority who can force each driver to depart at a specific time, however, this solution is not likely to occur in practice. Indeed, it yields different costs to different drivers, depending on their starting time. In other words, the globally optimal solution is not a Nash equilibrium: there are drivers who can strictly reduce their individual cost, by changing the departure time.
To achieve a Nash equilibrium solution, one needs to modify the model, allowing for arbitrarily large departure rates. We thus assume that, if drivers arrive at the beginning of the highway at a rateū(t) > M larger than the maximum flux defined at ( const1 1.7), they join a queue. The length of this queue q(t) ≥ 0 and the flux of cars entering the highway are determined as follows.
• Either q(t) = 0, orq(t)
• Instead of ( inc 1.11), the conservation law ( CP 1.10) is solved with initial condition
Remarkably, it turns out that the Lax formula provides the correct solution also for this more general model, without requiring any modification. Indeed, let
be the total number of drivers that have crossed the point x along the highway at some time ≤ t. Let Q(t) denote the number of drivers that have started their journey at a time ≤ t (joining the queue at the entrance of the highway, if there is any). Then the function U provides a solution to the Cauchy problem
(1.13) HJ
Interpreting U = U (t, x) as the value function for an auxiliary optimization problem, for every x > 0 the solution of ( HJ 1.13) is provided by
where f * is the Legendre transform of f .
Our analysis shows that, for every κ > 0, there exists a unique right-continuous, nondecreasing function t → Q(t), with
such that the solution of ( HJ 1.13) yields a Nash equilibrium. That means: a solution where none of the drivers can lower his own cost by changing his departure time. This implies that all drivers face exactly the same cost, regardless of the time at which they decide to join the queue.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with an optimization problem for a scalar conservation law, where the cost depends only on the initial and terminal profile of the solution. Rather than ( CP 1.10), we write the conservation law in the more familiar form
Of course, switching the variables t and x is purely for notational convenience. Under suitable assumptions on the cost functional, we prove the existence of a unique globally optimal solution u = u(t, x). By deriving a set of necessary conditions for optimality, the optimal solution can be accurately described.
In Section 3 we state a precise concept of Nash equilibrium solution, writing the conservation law ( claw2 1.16) in the integrated form
For each κ > 0 we show that there exists a unique initial condition Q satisfying ( const3 1.15) which yields a Nash equilibrium. Using the Lax formula, this solution can also be described in detail.
In Section 4 we show how the previous results apply to the original traffic problem. As an example, the globally optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium solution are explicitly computed, in the case where the cost functions are given by ( We observe that, by introducing an additional time-dependent cost φ(t) at the entrance of the highway (at a toll booth), one can easily transform the globally optimal solution into a Nash equilibrium. This provides a natural strategy for optimal toll pricing.
For a basic introduction to scalar conservation laws and the Lax formula we refer to the books of Evans
Evans

[6] or Smoller
Smoller [17] . An extension of the Lax formula to initial-boundary value problems was derived in LF [14] . Optimality conditions for weak solutions of hyperbolic conservation laws, also in the presence of shocks, were obtained in BM2, BS, U1, U2 [3, 4, 18, 19] . However, since the present problem requires only an optimal choice of the initial data for a scalar conservation law, our derivation of necessary conditions will be self-contained, relying on a direct application of the Lax formula.
Various optimization problems for traffic flow, based on the Lighthill-Whitham conservation law model, have been considered in FHM, GP, GHKL, HKK [9, 10, 11, 12] . Global optima and equilibria for a different kind of transport problem were recently studied in CCP [5] , also providing results on the asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria. For an introduction to differential games and for recent applications to traffic flow on networks we refer to Bgames, F [2, 7] and FKKR [8] , respectively.
Optimal solutions to a conservation law
Consider the scalar conservation law
Given a time T > 0 and a constant κ > 0, consider the following optimization problem. Among all the initial data
satisfying the constraints
find one which minimizes the cost functional
Here u(T, ·) is the value at time t = T of the unique entropy admissible solution to the Cauchy problem (
In order to prove the existence of optimal solution and derive a set of necessary conditions for optimality, the following assumptions will be used. 
In other words, for each λ ∈ I we define
Notice that I is the set of all possible characteristic speeds, as u ranges in [0, M ]. It is convenient to extend f to a function f : R → R ∪ {+∞}, by setting
In the case where f (M −) = +∞, it is understood that f (u) = +∞ whenever u > M . Let
Calling u = u(p) the point where the maximum in ( Lt 2.10) is attained, we have d dp f
The unique entropy-admissible solution to the Cauchy problem (
2) can now be obtained by the Lax formulas
One can show that, for all except countably many points x ∈ R, the expression on the right hand side of ( ydef 2.12) attains its global minimum at a single point y(t, x). In case the minimum is attained at several points, we denote by y − (t, x) and y + (t, x) respectively the smallest and the largest of such points. One has
Moreover, under the assumption f (u) ≥ b, the Oleinik estimates hold:
(2.14) olin Lemma 1. Let the flux function f satisfy the assumptions (A1). Let u = u(t, x) be a solution whose initial condition u(0, x) =ū(x) satisfies ( inconst 2.3). Then for any given T > 0 the following holds.
(i) There exists R large enough such that
(ii) Given any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, for every solutionũ whose initial data satisfy
Hereỹ ± is defined in the same way as y ± , replacing u withũ.
Proof. (i) By construction,
If the set of characteristic speeds I is bounded, it suffices to take R .
Notice that in this case ( yxdist 2.15) remains valid even without the assumption u(0, x) dx = κ.
as soon as
Hence the minimum in ( (ii) Assuming that the conclusion does not hold, we shall derive a contradiction. Letū n : R → [0, M ] be a sequence of initial data with ū n −ū L 1 → 0. Assume that there exists a sequence of points x n such that y
for every n ≥ 1. Here y + n refers to the initial dataū n , while y + refers to the initial dataū. (The case where y − n (T, x n ) < y + (T, x n + ε) − ε is entirely similar.)
By the optimality of y + (T, x n + ε) and y + n (T, x n ), we obtain
For notational convenience, from now on we shall write
The above inequalities imply
(2.18) in1 By the assumption (A1), the flux function f is increasing and strictly convex on [0, M ], C 2 on ]0, M [. Hence f * is differentiable and its derivative (f * ) = (f ) −1 is also strictly increasing. Introducing the notations z n = (x n − y + n )/T , z n,ε = (x n − y + n,ε )/T , the inequality ( in1 2.18) can be written as
The fact that (f * ) is strictly increasing implies that
for some constant δ ≥ 0 and all a, b ∈ [f (0+), R/T ] with b ≥ a + ε.
By ( zin 2.17), for every n ≥ 1 we have z n + ε/T ≤ z n,ε . Hence the left hand side of ( prop1 2.19) remains ≥ δ for every n, while the right hand side goes to zero. This achieves a contradiction.
Existence of an optimal solution.
The goal of this section is to prove the existence of an optimal solution to the minimization problem described at ( 
The above inequality is strict, unlessū already vanishes outside
Proof. Choose a radius R 1 > 0 such that 2M R 1 = κ. Let R be the constant introduced at ( yxdist 2.15) and choose a radius R 2 > R 1 + 2R large enough so that
Such a radius certainly exists, because the left hand side of ( 
We claim that ( 
Observe that the above inequality is strict, except in the case whereū † =ū. Proof. Let (ū n ) n≥1 be a minimizing sequence. Because of Lemma 2, it is not restrictive to assume that all functionsū n vanish outside the interval [−R 2 , R 2 ]. By taking a subsequence we can assume the weak convergenceū n ū for some u ∈ L 1 . Since all functionsū n satisfy the constraints ( inconst 2.3), we clearly havē
Because of the Oleinik type estimates ( olin 2.14), for every t > 0 the functions u n (t, ·) have uniformly bounded variation. In turn, this implies that the maps t → u n (t, ·) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous from [δ, T ] into L 1 (R), for any fixed δ > 0. Using a version of Helly's compacness theorem (see for example Theorem 2.4 in Bbook [1] ), by taking a further subsequence we can achieve the convergence 
Moreover, ( L1conv 2.25) yields the convergence U n (t, x) → U (t, x), uniformly in x, for every fixed t > 0.
The weak convergenceū n ū, together with the strong convergence u n (T, ·)−u(T, ·) L 1 (R) → 0 and the uniform boundedness of the supports, yield
Hence u is an optimal solution.
Necessary conditions for optimality.
Let u = u(t, x) be an optimal solution of the conservation law ( claw 2.1), providing a minimum to the functional ( costf 2.4), subject to the constraints ( inconst 2.3) on the initial data. Aim of this section is to provide a detailed description of u, deriving a set of necessary conditions for optimality.
For each y ∈ R, consider the maximal and minimal backward characteristics through (T, y). Recall that, by (A1), the characteristic speed f (u) is a strictly increasing function of u. Hence u(T, ·) has locally bounded variation, satisfies a one-sided Lipschitz condition, and has at most countably many downward jumps. Calling u(T, x+) ≤ u(T, x−) the right and left limits of u(T, ·) at the point x, we then define
Notice that y − , y + are the initial points of the minimal and maximal backward characteristics through the point (T, x). We recall that y is called a Lebesgue point for the functionū if
Sinceū ∈ L 1 (R), the above limit holds at a.e. y ∈ R.
Remark 2. If y is a Lebesgue point forū, then y ∈ I(x) for a unique point x. In other words, y cannot be the center of a rarefaction wave. Indeed, assume, on the contrary, that y ∈ I(x 1 ) ∩ I(x 2 ) for some
For every ρ > 0 small, this implies:
which is impossible if y is a Lebesgue point.
We now derive a necessary condition valid at all Lebesgue points ofū.
Lemma 3. Let u = u(t, x) be an optimal solution of ( 
Proof. Since y 1 , y 2 are Lebesgue points ofū, by Remark 2, the points x 1 < x 2 in ( a3 2.27) are uniquely determined. Assuming that ( nc1 2.28) fails, we will derive a contradiction. Indeed, we will construct a new initial dataū † which is slightly smaller thanū in a neighborhood of y 1 and slightly larger thatū in a neighborhood of y 2 , thus yielding a lower total cost. 2. Choose points
whereū is continuous and such that
Notice that the continuity ofū at x ± i implies that the corresponding points
are uniquely defined. Consider the points
3. By the assumption ( a3 2.27), for every ε > 0 sufficiently small we can construct a second initial conditionū † such that
4. By ( xpm 2.30), using part (ii) of Lemma 1 we can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such that the corresponding solutions u, u † of (
for all x ∈ [x 2 − δ , x 2 + δ] .
By the strict inequality ( mm2 2.29), the above relations imply that J(ū † ) < J(ū), contradicting the optimality ofū.
The following theorem yields a precise description of the optimal solution. Theorem 2. In addition to (A1)-(A2), assume that f (u) → +∞ as u → M −. Then, for every κ > 0, the optimization problem described at ( For every x ∈ R, let y c (x) be the unique point such that
Then, along the segment with endpoints (0, y c (x)), (T, x), the function u is defined according to:
(ii) If
Proof. 1. Assume that the optimal solution contains a shock. Callx the position of this shock at time t = T , and let
be the left and right limits of u(T, ·) at this point. Notice that these limits exists, because u(T, ·) has bounded variation. Computing the minimal and maximal backward characteristics through the point (T,x) we find
Consider any two points y 1 , y 2 ∈ [y − , y + ], say with y 1 < y 2 . Since ϕ(y 1 ) > ϕ(y 2 ), we must have eitherū(y 1 ) = 0 orū(y 2 ) = M . In the opposite case Lemma 3 would yield a contradiction. We thus conclude that there exists a point ξ ∈ [y − , y + ] such that
We claim that ( alt 2.35) also leads to a contradiction. Indeed, if ξ > y − , then
This contradicts the optimality of y − in the Lax representation ( ydef 2.12). On the other hand, if ξ = y − , since both y − and y + yield the minimum in ( ydef 2.12), we have
Hence the right hand side of ( ii 2.36) is strictly negative and equality cannot hold. This contradiction shows that the optimal solution cannot contain shocks. 
To prove (
We claim thatū(x) < h for all x. Otherwise, choose a point x 0 such thatū(x 0 ) ≥ h. Then, since no shocks are present, computing the solution by the method of characteristics we find
Consider the point x T . = x 0 + T f (ū(x 0 )). Since x 0 ≥ −R 1 , the choice of h implies x T > R 2 . We thus have u(T, x T ) =ū(x 0 ) ≥ h > 0, contradicting the fact that the support of u(T, ·) should be contained in [−R 2 , R 2 ]. This proves our claim, and hence ( 3. Since no shocks are present, the solution u is continuous for t > 0. As a consequence, backward characteristics are uniquely defined. In particular, at t = T , for each x ∈ R the minimizer y = y(T, x) in the Lax representation ( ydef 2.12) is unique. We recall that y(T, x) is the initial point on the characteristic line which ends at (T, x).
By Lemma 3 and (
Since ϕ is strictly decreasing, this yields
Therefore, along the (characteristic) segment with endpoints (0, y c (x)), (T, x) and slope f (v), v =ū(y c ) = u(T, x), the function u = u(t, x) is determined by ( ca1 2.33).
6.
Observe that the second identity in ( ycT 2.38) always holds, because the solution u = u(t, x) is continuous for t > 0 and backward characteristics are unique. In this step we prove that the first equality in ( for somex .
it is clear thatū(ỹ) > 0. By step 5, we haveỹ = y(T,x) = y c (x). Sincex ≥ x butỹ < y c (x), recalling that ϕ is strictly decreasing we obtain
contradicting the fact that all terms in the above expression are equal to c.
On the other hand, if y(T, x) > y c (x), letỹ ∈ ]y c (x), y(T, x) [ be a Lebesgue point ofū. Theñ
Since u(0,ỹ) < M , using Lemma 3 and the assumptions ϕ < 0, ψ ≥ 0 we obtain
again reaching a contradiction.
We thus conclude that, if
.33) holds.
7.
Next, consider the case where
As in the previous steps, we can then find a Lebesgue pointỹ ∈ ]y(T,x), y c (x)[ such that
Thenỹ = y(T,x), for some pointx satisfying
Henceū(ỹ) > 0. We thus have
reaching contradiction to. This proves our claim.
Since f is strictly increasing, from ( 
8.
In this final step, we prove the uniqueness of the optimal solution.
Observe that, for each value of the constant c ∈ R, the properties ( Assume that, for some κ > 0, there exists two optimal solutions, say u 1 , u 2 . If u 1 = u 2 , these solutions will satisfy ( Since ϕ is strictly decreasing, for every x ∈ R there exist unique values y c 2 (x) < y c 1 (x) such that ϕ(y c 1 (x)) + ψ(x) = c 1 , ϕ(y c 2 (x)) + ψ(x) = c 2 .
For every x such that
, by the previous analysis the values of u 1 (T, x) and u 2 (T, x) are implicitly defined
Since f is strictly increasing, for every x ∈ R this provides the implication
Therefore, by conservation of the total mass we conclude
This contradicts the assumption that all integrals are = κ, thus proving uniqueness.
Remark 3. The optimality conditions derived in Theorem 2 apply to traffic flow as well as to other models, such as supply-chains. All the analysis, based on the Lax formula, is valid for scalar conservation laws as long as the flux function is convex and depends only on the density of the conserved quantity.
On the other hand, this technique cannot be used when the flux depends also on the variables t, x, or in connection with second-order traffic models which are described by system of conservation laws. To analyze these more complex situations, necessary conditions for optimality can still be obtained in the form of a Pontryagin maximum principle BM2, BS [3, 4] , but only within a class of piecewise regular solutions.
The Nash equilibrium s:Nash
Aim of this section is to give a precise definition of Nash equilibrium solution for the above problem of traffic flow, and prove its existence and uniqueness.
Introducing the integral function U (t, x)
. = 
Throughout the following, f denotes the flux function extended to the entire real line as in ( fext 2.9), while f * is the corresponding Legendre transform, defined at ( Lt 2.10). For our application to traffic flow, one should keep in mind that the x variable denotes time, while t ∈ [0, T ] denotes a point along the highway. Hence U (t, x) measures the total number of cars that have crossed the point t along the highway during the time interval ] − ∞, x].
As initial data we shall consider any bounded non-decreasing function Q : R → R + , with
Here Q(x) denotes the total number of cars that have entered the queue at the entrance of the highway up to time x. Notice that Q is continuous except for countably many times x.
To fix the ideas, we shall consider the right-continuous version where Q(x) = Q(x+) coincides with its right limit at every x. When needed, we shall denote by Q(x−) = lim y→x− Q(y) the left limit of Q at x.
For a given Q(·), consider the Lipschitz continuous function
Notice that Q(x) − U (x) measures the length of the queue at time x, while U (x) denotes the total number of drivers that have actually departed (after clearing the queue) up to time x.
For t > 0, the entropy-admissible solution to the Cauchy problem ( 
(3.4) U Observe that the last two expressions in (
To visualize the profile of this solution at time t = T , it is convenient to introduce the function h(s) .
Observe that h is a concave function. Setting µ .
3.4) it now follows (see fig.
f:t43
3)
In other words, U (T, x) is the amount by which we can shift upward the graph of h(· − x), before hitting the graph of Q(·) (or, equivalently, the graph of U ). From this construction it is clear that the map x → U (T, x) is nondecreasing. For solutions with different initial data one has the comparison property
Given an initial data Q(·) as in ( Qinfty 3.2), for β ∈ [0, κ[ we define the points x q (β), x d (β), and
x a (β) = sup{x ∈ R ; U (T, x) ≤ β} .
(3.9) xqdadef
In the application to traffic flow, β is a Lagrangian variable labeling a particular driver. In this case, x q (β) accounts for the time where this driver joins the queue, x d (β) is the actual departure time and x a (β) is the arrival time.
Remark 4. For all except countably many β, the points x q (β) and x d (β) are uniquely determined by the identities 
3.7) does not change if Q(·) is replaced by U (·). f:t43
Moreover (see fig. f:t45 4), for a.e. β the arrival time x a is determined as
More generally, for a driver that departs at time x, we define the arrival time as .
On the other hand, if the driver starting at time x encounters traffic, his arrival time will simply be the supremum among the arrival times of all cars departed earlier.
Definition. We say that a bounded, nondecreasing initial data Q(·) satisfying ( In connection with the traffic model, condition (i) states that all drivers bear the same cost c. Condition (ii) says that, regardless of the starting time x, no one can achieve a cost < c. 
3.2).
Proof. The result will be proved in several steps. The overall strategy is to show that (i) To each c ∈ R there exists a unique Nash equilibrium having cost c. This is determined by some initial data Q(·) having total mass κ(c) . = Q(+∞).
(ii) For some minimum cost c 0 , the map c → κ(c) is a strictly increasing, continuous map from [c 0 , +∞[ onto [0, +∞[ .
1.
For a fixed constant c, let Q c be the family of all bounded, non-decreasing initial data Q(·) such that Q(−∞) = 0, and such that the corresponding solution U = U (t, x) in ( 
2. In the remainder of the proof we show the initial data
yields a Nash equilibrium solution U * = U * (t, x).
To begin with, we check that, if Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Q c , then the function Q 3 (x) . = max{Q 1 (x), Q 2 (x)} also lies in Q c . Indeed, let β ∈ [0, κ(c)] and, to fix the ideas, assume
with obvious meaning of notations. Then
Since ϕ < 0 and ψ ≥ 0, this yields
Therefore, Q 3 ∈ Q c as well.
Using this property of the set Q c , we can construct a sequence functions Q n (·) ∈ Q c such that, for every x ∈ R, the sequence Q n (x) increases monotonically to Q * (x). Since all functions Q n are constant outside a bounded interval, we clearly have Q * (−∞) = 0, Q * (+∞) = κ(c). We claim that Q * ∈ Q c . Indeed, by monotonicity and pointwise convergence we have x q n (β) → x q (β), for a.e β ∈ [0, κ(c)]. Therefore, x a n (β) → x a (β) for a.e β. The continuity of ϕ and ψ now yields
Therefore, Q * ∈ Q c .
3. In this step we show that the solution U * of ( hj 3.1) with initial data Q * is a Nash equilibrium.
To prove ( By the continuity of ϕ, we can choose ε > 0 small enough so that
Consider the perturbed initial data
We claim that Q ∈ Q c . Indeed, since Q ≥ Q * , the corresponding solutions satisfy U (T, x) ≥ U * (T, x) for every x. For any β ∈ [0, κ(c)], two cases can arise:
. In this case one has
Therefore, recalling that ϕ < 0 while ψ ≥ 0, we obtain
. In this case, by ( epch 3.18) one has It remains to prove that ( nobetter 3.14) also holds. Let x ∈ R be given. Again we consider two cases. CASE 1: There exists a sequence of values β n → Q(x) satisfying ( ecost 3.13), such that x q (β) → x. In this case we have x a (β n ) → A(x). By the continuity of ϕ, ψ, the inequality ( nobetter 3.14) is then an immediate consequence of ( ecost 3.13). CASE 2: Q(y) = β 0 is a constant for all y in a neighborhood of x. In this case, if
we can still conclude
It thus remains to examine the case where ( limA 3.19) does not hold. Assume that ( nobetter 3.14) fails. Then there exists δ > 0 such that
Introduce the constant η . = −h(−µ − δ) and consider the function
We claim that Q ∈ Q c . Indeed, the choice of η yields
The above construction shows that, if ( nobetter 3.14) fails, then Q * is not maximal. This completes the proof that Q * provides a Nash equilibrium solution.
4. In this step we prove that, for any given c ∈ R, the Nash equilibrium solution corresponding to the cost c is unique.
For each x ∈ R, denote by z(x) the point such that
Notice that z(x) is uniquely defined, because ϕ is strictly decreasing. If now Q is an initial data yielding a Nash solution U = U (t, x) with cost c, recalling the definitions ( xqdadef 3.9) one has
Remark 5. Since the map β → x a (β) is strictly increasing, if Q has a jump at a point x 0 then ψ must be constant on the nontrivial interval x a (Q(x 0 −)) , x a (Q(x 0 +)) . If we assume that the cost ψ is strictly increasing, then the distribution Q(·) which yields a Nash equilibrium must be continuous.
Consider two initial data Q 1 (x) and Q 2 (x), yielding two Nash equilibrium solutions corresponding to the same cost c. Since ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → −∞, there exists x − ∈ R such that Q 1 (x) = Q 2 (x) = 0 for all x ≤ x − + 1. The uniqueness property will be proved by showing that, for every ε > 0,
Indeed, if ( 
and moreover: either
or else Q 2 has a jump at x 0 and
A contradiction is derived as follows. Let β . = Q 1 (x 0 −). Choose a point (ξ, β ) where the graph of the function y → β + h(y − x a 1 (β)) touches the closure of the graph of Q 1 . This means
We consider three cases. 5, left).
Consider the higher level β . = β +ε(ξ −x − ) and observe that x a 2 (β ) ≥ x a 1 (β). Since the map 
Observing that the function h(·) is continuously differentiable with
the above inequality implies
Indeed, setting β 2 . = Q 2 (x 0 −), the contact point ξ 2 defined by
must satisfy ξ 2 < x 0 . By continuity, we can find β < β +ε(
providing a contradiction.
CASE 3: the inequalities ( In this case, define The construction used to prove uniqueness, in CASE 3. Here
Hence, for the distribution Q 1 , the arrival time of a driver starting at a time x > 0 satisfies
Choosing β such that β 1 + η < β < Q 2 (x 0 +) , we achieve the strict inequality
The assumption that Q 2 is a Nash solution implies
Thanks to ( A1x 3.26), we can find x > x 0 such that
Hence ( nobetter 3.14) fails, contradicting the assumption that Q 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Putting together all cases, we thus obtain the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution, for every fixed cost c. 
Let U, U ε be the be the corresponding solutions of ( 
We claim that, for a.e. β ∈ [0, κ(c)] one has the strict inequality 
Indeed, for a.e. β ∈ [0, κ(c)] there exist a unique point x d (β) such that
For any β as above, consider the arrival time
By the second relation in ( bprop 3.30), any point (ξ, β ) where the graph of β + h(· − x a (β)) touches the graph of U must satisfy
Moreover, for y ≤ x d (β), one has
Therefore (see fig. f:t47 7), for y ≤ x d (β), the graph of y → (1 − ε)β + h(y − x a (β)) has strictly positive distance from the graph of y → U ε (y). By the definition of x a ε , this yields the strict inequality ( For notational convenience, in the following we write β ε . = (1 − ε)β. In connection with the new initial data U ε , we claim that CASE 1: ψ(x a ε (β ε )) < ψ(x a (β)). Then we immediately conclude
CASE 2: ψ(x a ε (β ε )) = ψ(x a (β). In this case we observe that, since ψ is continuous and nondecreasing, there can be at most countably many disjoint open intervals ]a , b [ such that ψ is constant on each closed interval J .
Recalling that ϕ is strictly decreasing, for each there can be at most one point y such that
Since the map β → x d (β) is strictly increasing, there can be at most one value β such that
If now ψ(x a ε (β ε )) = ψ(x a (β)), then the two points x a (β), x a ε (β ε ) must lie in the same interval J , for some ≥ 1. Hence, either β = β , or else ϕ(x d (β)) + ψ(x a (β)) < c. The first possibility can occur only for countably many values of β. The second alternative leads to
This proves our claim ( Based on the previous analysis, we can now choose δ > 0 such that the set
The new initial data
Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, this proves
Therefore the map c → κ(c) is continuous, hence surjective. This completes the proof.
Application to traffic flow
In order to apply the previous results to our specific problem of traffic flow, it suffices to switch the variables t, x, and check that the flux function f , defined as a partial inverse of the map ρ → ρ v(ρ), satisfies the assumptions (A1). Under natural hypotheses on the velocity v = v(ρ), this is straightforward (see fig. f:t44 1). Indeed, define
Assume that the second derivative of the flux of cars satisfies In the next sections we explicitly compute the globally optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium solution for the traffic flow problem, in the case where the velocity function v and the cost functions ϕ, ψ are given by
The globally optimal solution
Consider the Cauchy problem 
Observe that the speed of cars is ≤ v 0 . Hence the time needed to get to destination is ≥ L/v 0 . Setting
it is clear that the total amount of cars that can incur in a cost ≤ c 0 is zero.
Using Theorem 2, we now describe the globally optimal solution ( 
Then the flux function u = u(t, x) for the optimal solution is as follows (see fig. f:t35
we can associate a unique initial time
At all points along the segment joining (τ q (s), 0) with (s, L), the flux function u is given by
so that f (u) coincides with the slope of this segment. On the other hand,
Notice that the triangle with vertices (τ 0 , 0),
is the domain of a centered rarefaction wave. The initial dataū = u(t, 0) is determined bȳ
Recalling that t = τ q (s) = s 2 − c, we obtain
Notice that the total flux
is a continuous, increasing function of c.
Remark 6.
A globally optimal solution can be characterized by the identity ( costc 4.6), where τ q (s) and s represent the initial and terminal time along a characteristic. On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium solution can still be characterized by the identity ( costc 4.6), but with τ q (s) and s now being the initial and terminal time along a particle trajectory, i.e. the departure and arrival time of individual drivers. These are not at all the same. Indeed, characteristic curves for the conservation law in ( Cauchy 4.2) satisfy the equation
while particle trajectories satisfy
The left hand sides of ( 
The Nash equilibrium solution
We now construct a Nash equilibrium solution, where all drivers incur in the same cost c. The initial data will be described by the function t → Q(t), counting the number of drivers that have started their journey (possibly joining the queue at the entrance of the highway, if there is any) within time t.
Fix any cost c > L/v 0 and let τ 0 , τ 1 be as in ( 
be the total flux of this solution through the point x = L, for t < 0. In other words, this is the total number of cars which arrive at destination before time t = 0. The Nash equilibrium solution has the following properties (see fig. f:t36 9).
• Before time τ 0 , no cars enter the queue.
• Exactly at time τ 0 , an amount δ 0 of cars arrives and instantly forms a queue at the entrance of the highway.
• The last of the cars which entered the queue at t = τ 0 departs at time τ 2 = τ 0 + (δ 0 /M ) and arrives at destination exactly at time t = 0.
• The queue shrinks to zero at some time τ 3 . When this happens, a shock is formed, moving along some curve S.
• After time τ 3 , cars keep coming to the entrance of the highway, and depart instantly, until time τ 1 . No driver begins his journey after time τ 1 .
To explicitly compute this solution, we first consider the problem
Callingρ the solution of this Riemann problem, and settingũ =ρ v(ρ), we find
This yields
(4.14) delta
For t > τ 0 , the value of Q(t) is computed using the equation
By ( the queue is depleted and a shock is formed in the solution. Call t S the time where this shock hits the boundary x = L, and set τ 4 . = τ q (t S ). Then for t ∈ [τ 0 , τ 4 ] the function Q(·) is still given by the explicit formula ( Qsol 4.15). On the other hand, for τ 4 < t < τ 1 , the value of Q can be computed from the equation
where U is the solution of ( HJ 1.13). Since for u > 0 the characteristic speed f (u) is strictly larger than the particle speed f (u)/u, the right hand side of ( 
Some numerical results
We first numerically compute a Nash equilibrium solution for the problem ( We use an upwind method to solve the conservation law and locate the position of the shock at the terminal point x = 1. A numerical simulation shows that t S = 2.055, and therefore τ 4 = t 2 S − 2.7 = 1.5230. The last driver begins his journey at time By imposing the additional cost φ(t) = c max − c(t) at a toll booth at the entrance of the highway, the globally optimal solution becomes a Nash equilibrium.
f:dcost1
Next, we compute the globally optimal solution for the same parameter values as in ( parvalue 4.18) and the same total flux κ = 3.80758 found for the Nash solution. Numerically, we find that the solution is described by ( In connection with traffic flow, a natural problem is the following. Assume that, by charging a (time dependent) toll p(t) at the entrance of the highway, we wish to collect a total revenue R. What is the best way to choose the additional cost function p(·)?
Notice that, if a flat rate p(t) ≡p is imposed, each driver should thus be asked to payp = R/κ, where κ is the total number of cars entering the highway. This choice, however, would not have any influence on the overall traffic pattern: replacing the starting cost ϕ(t) with ϕ(t) +p does not change the Nash equilibrium solution.
On the other hand, by imposing a time dependent toll p(·), a more efficient traffic pattern can be achieved. This leads to the problem of finding a function p(t) ≥ 0 which minimizes the total cost to all drivers (ϕ(t) + p(t)) u(t, 0) dt + ψ(t) u(t, L) dt (4.28) totcp subject to u(t, 0) dt = κ , p(t) u(t, 0) dt = R . Here u = u(t, x) is the car flux, in the Nash equilibrium solution corresponding to the new starting costφ(t) = ϕ(t) + p(t) and the same arrival cost ψ(t). Notice that, by Theorem 3, the Nash solution is uniquely determined by the choice of p(·).
If the desired revenue R > 0 is sufficiently large, this problem has a simple solution. Indeed, let u = u * (t, x) be the globally optimal solution to the problem ( . Let τ a (t) be the arrival time of the driver who departs at time t, and let c(t) . = ϕ(t) + ψ(τ a (t)) be his total cost. Call c max . = max c(t) ; u * (t, 0) > 0 the maximum cost among all drivers, in this globally optimal solution. Consider the toll fee p(t) . = c R − c(t), choosing the constant c R so that (c R − c(t))u * (t, 0) dt = R .
If R ≥ (c max − c(t)) u * (t, 0) dt then one readily checks that c R ≥ c max and the flux function u * provides a Nash solution for the traffic flow problem where the starting cost ϕ is replaced byφ(t) = ϕ(t) + p(t). It is now clear that p(·) is the optimal pricing strategy, because it indices the most efficient traffic flow pattern, namely u * .
